





The conclusion of the Antarctic Treaty' completed earlier endeavors2 to
find an international regime for Antarctica within the framework of the
United Nations (U.N.) and solve existing issues which were in international
arbitration.3 During the first decade of the Treaty's existence, the efforts of
various United Nations agencies (specifically, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)) to take a more
active role in the management of Antarctica have encountered firm and
successful resistance from the Consultative Parties of the Antarctic Treaty
(Parties) .4
This situation changed fundamentally during the second decade of the
Treaty system (1969-1979). New forces supporting the international man-
agement of space and resources rather than national jurisdiction emerged:
*Assistant, Dept. of Constitutional Law, University of Bonn, Federal Republic of Germany.
1. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 795, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402 U.N.T.S. 72
(entered into force for the United States, June 23, 1961). For an excellent introduction, see
Oxman, The Antarctic Regime: An Introduction, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 285 (1978); Dupuy, Le
Traitg sur L'Antarctique, 6 A.F.D.I. 111 (1960).
2. WOLFRUM, DIE INTERNATIONALISIERUNG STAATSFREIER RAUME (The Internationalization of
Common Spaces Outside National Jurisdiction), 49-55 (1984); Note, A Thaw in International
Law 87 YALE L. J. 804, 845 n. 197 (1978).
3. Antarctica Cases (U.K. v. Argen., U.K. v. Chile), 1956 I.C.J. Pleadings, Oral Argu-
ments, Documents 15.
4. See AUBURN, Antarctica Law and Politics, 120 (1982); the Consultative Parties are:
Argentina, Belgium, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, U.S.S.R., United
Kingdom, U.S.A. (original signatory states of the Treaty); Poland (acquired Consultative
Status in 1977), West Germany (1981), Brazil (1983) and India (1983).
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Third World pressure for the implementation of a new international eco-
nomic order (NIEO),5 the new jurisdiction for the deep seabed in UNCLOS
1116 and the incorporation of "common heritage principle ' 7 in the Moon
Treaty. 8 These forces led to a new challenge to the Treaty system: the
question of a new international regime for Antarctica and its resources.
Prominent speakers from third world countries have demanded a new
international regime for Antarctica throughout the seventies 9 but these
efforts have been consistently rejected by the parties. 10 Different positions
arose during the discussions of the "Question of Antarctica" at the United
Nations." These debates focused mainly on a proposed new international
regime for the management of Antarctica's mineral resources. 12 This article
briefly describes the recent U.N. deliberations on Antarctica and identifies
the policy concerns underlying them.
II. Existing Legal Framework for
the Management of Antarctica
The 1959 Treaty' 3 established the legal jurisdiction for Antarctica,
guaranteeing international stability, demilitarization (Art. I) and scientific
5. See G. A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), U.N. Doc. A/9551 (1974), reprinted in Official Documents, 68
A.J.I.L. 798 (1974).
6. U.N. Convention of the Law of the Sea, U.N. Sales No. E.83.V.5 (1982), reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 126 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS II1]. Art. 136 states: "The area and its
resources are the common heritage of mankind."
7. On that principle and its legal validity in international law, see Kiss, Patrimoine commun
de i'Humanite, 175 R.C.A.D.I. 99-245 (1982); White, The Common Heritage of Mankind: An
Assessment, 14 CASE W. RESERVE J. INT'L L. 509-542 (1982); WOLFRUM, supra note 2, at
331-336.
8. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,
G.A. Res. 34/68, U.N. Doc. A/34/46, at 77; reprinted in The U.N. Treaties on Outer Space,
(1984) (U.N. Sales No. E.84.1.10) and 7 J. SPACE L. 165 (1979).
9. E.g. Statement of Ambassador Pinto (Sri Lanka), The Int'l Community andAntarctica, 33
U. MIAMI L. REV. 475-487 (1978) Antarctic Challenge-Proceedings of an Interdisciplinary
Symposium, id. at 164-168 (1984).
10. See most recently Question of Antarctica, study requested under G.A. Res. 38/77,
Report of the Secretary General (Views of States), U.N. Doc. A/39/583 (Part II) (1984)
[hereinafter the S.G. Report]; id. at 90, para. 305 (statement of Australia).
11. See U.N. Doc. A/38/C.1/PV 42-46 (1983); for a summary see S.G. Report, supra note
10, Part I, at 33-44.
12. See the following writings on this issue: Alexander, A Recommended Approach to the
Antarctic Resources Problem, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 371-425 (1978); Burton, New Stresses on the
Antarctic Treaty: Toward International Legal Institutions Governing Antarctic Resources, 65
VA. L. REV. 421-512 (1979); Colson, The Antarctic Treaty System: The Mineral Issue, 12
L. AND POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 841-902 (1980); Lagoni, Antarctica's Mineral Resources in Interna-
tional Law, 39 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES 6FFENTLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT (1979);
Zorn, Antarctic Minerals A Common Heritage Approach, 10 RESOURCES POL'Y 2-19 (1984);
Wolfrum, supra note 2, at 85-91.
13. Supra note 1, Parties see note 4.
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cooperation (Arts. II, 111).14 Member-states consist firstly of the twelve
Signatory States who participated in the Washington conference on the
Treaty' 5-the (permanent) Consultative Parties. Any country can accede to
the Treaty (Art. XIII); however, the nations which desire to join the Parties
have to "prove" their special scientific interest in Antarctica by "the estab-
lishment of a scientific station or dispatch of a scientific expedition" (Art.
IX, para. 2). Only the Parties manage the Antarctic affairs today, and only
these states may vote at the meetings under Art. IX, para. 1. 2). In these
meetings, member states decide on recommendations concerning the rel-
evant issues arising regarding the management of Antarctica (Art. IX, para.
1, e.g. scientific research and environmental issues).
The conference of member states under the Treaty operates by con-
sensus; thus, at least at first glance, there seems to be no distinction between
the voting rights of the Parties and the non-Consultative Parties. The
Parties, however, have reserved onto themselves the right to control the
management of Antarctic affairs, as any resulting recommendations enter
into force only after approval by all the Parties (Art. IX). Furthermore, only
the Parties are entitled to exercise the rights to inspect foreign stations under
Art. VII, para. 1.2.16
It is difficult to obtain consultative status under Art. IX because the
installation of a permanent scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific
expedition demands enormous financial and scientific resources. The high
"entry fee" to the club of the Parties has been repeatedly criticized by small
Third-World countries which feel excluded from the management of the
continent. The exclusiveness of the existing Treaty system was one of the
main issues during the U.N. debates on the issue.
17
III. Debates in the 38th United Nations
General Assembly (1983)
The political positions of the concerned states regarding the Treaty sys-
tem in general remained unchanged in 1983. The Third World's assessment
of the Treaty was most accurately expressed by Ambassador Ghebo of
Ghana, who stated that "the Treaty, in our view, cannot guarantee our
14. The Treaty Art. VI is concerned with its jurisdiction: "The provisions of the present
Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60' South Latitude, including all iceshelves, but nothing
in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or the exercise of the rights,
of any State under International Law with regard to the high seas within the area."
15. On the Conference, see The Conference on Antarctica-Conference Documents, the
Antarctic Treaty and Related Papers, Dept. of State Pub. 7060, International Conference
Series 13, (Washington 1960); Hanessia, The Antarctic Treaty 1959, 9 I.C.L.Q. 472 (1960).
16. On the advantageous status of the Parties, see WOLFRUM supra note 2, at 71-75.
17. See, Zorn, supra note 12, at 11 n. 21.
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Ghana, who stated that "the Treaty, in our view, cannot guarantee our
common heritage and at the same time be a rich man's club."' 18 An opposing
stand was taken by the Parties, who considered the Treaty as one of the best
examples of international cooperation for the past and future.' 9
The nonaligned countries initiated recent discussions on the Antarctica
issue, as expressed in the positions of India21 and Brazil.22 These two
prominent nonaligned states obtained Consultative Status under Art. IX in
1983. Though carefully expressed, the position of India and Brazil, once
they entered the "rich man's club," 23 changed to one of defending the
Treaty system against criticism from the smaller third world countries and
thus, Third World consensus on the Antarctica Question, if it had ever
existed, did not last long. Most recently, both India and Brazil became even
more solid supporters of the Treaty and rejected any proposed reform or
modification of the existing Treaty system.24
Their political positions were reiterated during the discussion of the
"mineral resources question" at which Third World states called for a
"common heritage approach" to the issue of the exploitation of the mineral
resources on the Antarctic continent.25 The Parties insisted that the issue of
mineral resources should be dealt with under the framework of the Treaty.
26
The debates in the First Committee on the subject failed to reach a
substantive agreement on the question of a future common management of
the continent and on the disposition of Antarctica's mineral resources.
Subsequently, the 38th General Assembly adopted resolution 38/77.27
18. U.N. Doc. A/38/C.1/PV 43, 21.
19. See Statement of Mr. Wolcott (Austrl.) on behalf of the Parties, U.N. Doc. A/38/C. 1/PV
48, 23; Position Paper adopted by the Parties Aug. 9, 1983, U.N. Doc. A/38/439 (1983);
Statement of Ambassador Sorzano (U.S.A.), U.N. Doc. A/38/C.1/PV 45, 8 (1983).
20. Final Communiqud of the Meetings of the Heads of States or Government of the
Non-Aligned Countries, New Delhi, Mar. 7-12, 1983; U.N. Doc. A/38/132 and Corr. 1 and 2,
Annex Sect. III paras. 122, 133. Final Communiqud of the Meetings of Ministers and Heads of
Delegation of the Non-Aligned Countries to the thirty-ninth session of the General Assembly,
New York, Oct. 1-5, 1984, U.N. Doc. A/39/560, para. 109.
21. Statement of Ambassador Verna (India), U.N. Doc. A/38/C.1/PV 43 (1984).
22. Statement of Ambassador Souza de Silva (Brazil), U.N. Doc. S/38/C.1/PV 43 (1984).
23. See supra, note 18.
24. See S.G. Report, supra note 10, Part II, Vol. II, at 11 (Brazil), 89 (India).
25. For further references see Zorn, supra note 12, at 11 42; Statement of Permanent
Representative Jakobs (Antigua and Barbuda), U.N. Doc. A/38/C.1/PV 42, 9; Statement of
Ambassador Zainal Abidin (Malaysia), id.
26. See the not yet officially published negotiating text of An Antarctic Resources Regime,
under consideration in the Parties meetings since 1977, reprinted in GREENPEACE, THE FUTURE
OF ANTARCTICA, App. 8 (1984); for the actual state of negotiations, see Kimball, International
Institute for Environment and Development (IUED), Report on Antarctica, 10 (1984). The last
Parties meeting (Rio de Janeiro, Feb. 25-Mar. 10, 1985) did not proceed to a new proposal on
this issue.
27. U.N. Doc. A/RES/38/77 (1984).
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Under that resolution, the Secretary General was requested "to prepare a
comprehensive, factual and objective study on all aspects of Antarctica,
taking fully into account the Antarctica Treaty System and other relevant
factors."
28
The discussions on the "Question of Antarctica" in the 38th General
Assembly remained deadlocked in a classic North-South dispute, or, to be
more precise, a Parties versus small Third World States confrontation.
Interestingly, the Eastern and Western Parties formed a successful political
alliance to block Third World aspirations.
IV. The S.G.'s Report and Discussions in the
39th United Nations General Assembly (1984)
A. A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT?
The Secretary General's report, 29 comprising two parts is certainly the
most recent and complete study of these issues. The first part, dealing with
the physical, legal, political and scientific issues, provides the necessary
information for a discussion of basic Antarctican affairs; the second part,
containing the views of fifty-four member states, shows clearly the different
positions already evident during previous discussions.30
The legal assessment of the "Question of Antarctica" is dealt with in
several portions of the S.G.'s report. Chapter II of the first part (Antarctica:
Legal and Political Aspects) ,31 and Chapter III of the report (The Antarctic
Treaty System in Practice) 32 are, in general, an accurate evaluation of the
existing Treaty system. It does, however, place particular emphasis on the
achievements under the Treaty and therefore it reflects mainly the political
positions of the Parties. Notably, the report lacks discussion of important
shortcomings of the Treaty.
1. Sovereignty Over Antarctica
The report deals firstly with the status of the different territorial claims
asserted by some Parties. 33 The report 34 neglects to deal, however, with the
28. Id., at operative para. 1.
29. See S.G. Report supra note 10; for a more positive evaluation of the S.G. Report, see
BOCKSLAFF, VEREINTE NATIONEN 51 (1985).
30. See supra notes 18-23 and accompanying text.
31. S.G. Report, supra note 10, Part I, at 13-33 (on sovereignty, the Treaty in general,
deliberations during the 38th U.N. General Assembly).
32. S.G. Report, supra note 10, at 33-78.
33. The claimant states are: Argent. (1942), Austl. (1933), Chile (1939), Fr. (1942), N. Z.
(1923), Nor. (1939), U.K. (1908).
34. S.G. Report, supra note 10, at 21.
FALL 1985
1314 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
doubts concerning the legal validity of these claims under international law
which have been widely discussed in political and legal circles.35
The legal validity of these claims is not only contested by "some non-
Treaty parties." 36 According to the standards of effective occupation under
international law, the legal force of these territorial claims remains
ambiguous. 37 Effective occupation as a means of acquisition of territory
must be based on two elements: possession and continuous administration,
the latter element being the decisive criterion. 38 In the words of the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice: ". . . a claim to sovereignty involves
two elements, each of which must be shown to exist: the intention and will to
act as a sovereign, and some actual continued display of such authority. " 39
Applying these standards to the claims to Antarctica, the first observation to
be made is that none of the claimant states has ever, strictly speaking,
"possessed" the territory claimed in Antarctica. In addition, it is doubtful
that the activities of the claimant states prior to the conclusion of the Treaty
would meet the conditions of an effective occupation (i.e. "some actual
continued display of authority"). 40 Even under "relaxed standards" appli-
cable to polar regions,41 the legal validity of these claims is disputable. These
arguments are missing from the S.G.'s report, making it inaccurate and
noncomprehensive.
2. The Treaty System and UNCLOS III
The second shortcoming of the S.G.'s report is that it avoids a serious
discussion of the relationship between the existing Treaty system and the
emerging Law of the Sea.42 The three main issues in that field are neglected
35. See Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L J. 297, 316-332 (1975);
Alexander, supra note 12, at 382-397; Note, supra note 2, at 811-828; Burton, supra note 12, at
460-483; Luard, Who Owns Antarctica?, 62 FOR. AFF. 1175 (1984).
36. S.G. Report, supra note 10, at 21; the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., both prominent Parties,
do not recognize any territorial claim on the Antarctic continent. On the Soviet position, see the
detailed paper of Boczek, The Soviet Union and the Antarctic Regime, 78 A.J.I.L. 824 (1984);
on different positions, see WOLFRUM, supra note 2, at 36-48.
37. The leading cases are: Eastern Greenland Case, 1933 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53;
Clipperton Island Case, U.N.R.I.A.A. II, 1105 (1931), reprinted in 26 A.J.I.L. 390 (1932); see
Note, supra note 2, at 818.
38. Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies, 25 BRIT. Y.
INT'L 311, 317 (1948); Bernhardt. supra note 35, at 324.
39. Eastern Greenland Case, supra note 37, at 45.
40. For a similar evaluation of the status of the claims, see AKEHURST, A MODERN
INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 144 (1984); Alexander, supra note 12, at 39 3-397;
Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 691, 725 (1981).
41. Bernhardt, supra note 35, at 326-332; WOLFRUM, supra note 2, at 46-48.
42. S.G. Report, supra note 10, at 27; on that topic, see Harry, The Antarctic Regime and the
Law of the Sea Convention: An Australian View, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 227-244 (1981); for a
German position see Scharnhorst-Miiller, The Impact of UNCLOS III on the Antarctic Regime,
in: Antarctic Challenge, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 169-176 (1984).
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by the S.G.'s report: 1) the question of an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
in Antarctica (Art. 55 et seq. UNCLOS 11I);43 2) the law applicable to the
continental shelf of Antarctica (Art. 76 et seq. UNCLOS III);44 and 3) the
jurisdiction of the deep seabed within the zone of application of the Antarc-
tic Treaty (Art. 133 UNCLOS III). The first two issues closely linked to the
question of sovereignty over Antarctica are discussed above.45 Prerequisite
to the exercise of sovereign rights in the EEZ and in the continental shelf is
the existence of a coastal state. 46 As the claims to sovereignty over Antarc-
tica are not internationally recognized, a claimant state's exercise of these
rights would encounter serious resistance from nonclaimant Parties and
Third World countries. The Parties to the Treaty probably would invoke
Art. IV to block the exercise of sovereign rights in the EEZ Antarctica by
claimant states.47 The consequences of this scenario are unclear.48 The
Parties may seek to establish a regime similar to the UNCLOS III EEZ
within the framework of the Treaty in order to exclude international orga-
nizations from the management of the Antarctican EEZ and the Continen-
tal Shelf of Antarctica. 49 The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic
Living Resources50 constitutes an example of these options under the
umbrella of the Treaty.
Even more complicated is the legal status of Antarctica's deep seabed and
ocean floor. 51 If the Parties try to bar the new international Seabed Author-
ity from management of the deep seabed within the area of application of
the Treaty52 by creating a mineral resources regime under the Treaty, this
strategy is questionable under Art. 311, para. 2 UNCLOS III,53 at least for
43. See Joyner, supra note 40, 691-725.
44. See Lagoni, supra note 12, at 23-25; for uncertainties in the U.S. position, ("legal status
of the continental shelf unclear") see U.S. Antarctic Policy, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Oceans and Int'l Environment of the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st. Sess. 19 (on
U.S. policy with respect to mineral exploitation and exploration of the Antarctic).
45. See supra note 7.
46. See UNCLOS III, supra note 6 at Arts. 55 and 76.
47. The Treaty Art. IV para. 2 provides: "No acts or activities taking place while the present
Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. ; see
Joyner, supra note 40, 724.
48. For a different point of view ("Common EEZ rights, to be exercised by the Parties"), see
Scharnhorst-Muiller, supra note 42, at 174-176. This point of view is incompatible with the
concept of the EEZ under international law.
49. For this strategy, see Lagoni, supra note 12, at 24.
50. May 20, 1980, BGBI 1982 II 420; reprinted in GREENPEACE supra note 26, app. II.
51. For an updated overview see Note, The Current Status of Deep Seabed Mining, 24 VA. J.
INT'L L. 361-417 (1984).
52. See PLATZOEDER, POLITISCHE KONZEPTIONEN ZUR NEUORDNUNG DES MEERESVOKERRECHTS
175 (1976); Lagoni, supra note 12, at 25.
53. See UNCLOS III, supra note 6, at Art. 311 para. 2 stipulates: "This Convention shall not
alter the rights and obligations of State Parties which arise from other agreements compatible
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those Parties participating in the UNCLOS III process. A minerals regime
managed exclusively by the Parties is probably not a "compatible" agree-
ment under Art. 311, para. 2 UNCLOS JI. The possibility of contradicting
obligations assumed by those Parties which have signed or ratified the
UNCLOS III or intend to do so should have been one of the relevant issues
included in the "comprehensive" S.G.'s report.
3. Consultative Status (Art. IX AT)
The third major shortcoming of the S.G.'s report is the inadequate
description of the Consultative Status. 54 The S.G.'s report refers to the
Consultative Status only as a "mechanism for the purpose of the exchange of
information, consultations, consideration and formulation of measures in
furtherance of the principles and objectives of the Treaty. 55 A major focus
of criticism of the existing Treaty system has been the financial barrier to
obtaining Consultative Status.56 Thus, in reality only the Parties today
manage Antarctic affairs. 57
The report's qualification of Consultative Status as a politically indifferent
annex to normal membership under the Treaty is incorrect and grossly
misleading.
B. ANTARCTICA ADJOURNED: DISCUSSIONS
DURING THE 39TH UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
58
The S.G.'s report was published too late to provide a basis for the debates
in the General Assembly and in the First Committee. Therefore, the politi-
cal positions of the states concerned remained unchanged. In particular,
Malaysia, 59 one of the states which initiated U.N. discussion on the "Ques-
tion of Antarctica," called for the establishment of a special committee on
Antarctica to elaborate the objectives of a new international regime for the
continent and its mineral resources. During the General Debates, Antigua
and Barbuda60 presented a detailed plan for the international management
of the mineral resources of Antarctica. These statements and the discussions
in the First Committee from November 28 to November 30, 1984,61 did not
with this Convention and which do not affect the enjoyment by other States Parties of their
rights or the performance of their obligations under this Convention." (emphasis added)
54. S.G. Report, supra note 10, at 28.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 3.
57. See Zorn, supra note 12, at 11; and Note, supra note 2, at 824.
58. See BOCKSLAFF, supra note 29, at 51-53.
59. Statement of Prime Minister H. E. Seri Mahatir Bin Mohammad (Malaysia), U.N. Doc.
A/39/PV 28 (1984).
60. Statement of Rep. Jobs (Antigua and Barbuda), U.N. Doc. A/39/PV 30, 11 (1984).
61. U.N. Doc. A/39/C.1/PV 50, 52-55 (1984).
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indicate any change in the political standpoint of the main protagonists-the
Parties and small Third World countries. The establishment of a Special
Committee on Antarctica remained the main goal of the first informal draft
resolution Malaysia circulated in the First Committee.62
Worth mentioning again are the statements of Brazil and India, the new
Parties, which defend the Treaty categorically against the criticism of small
Third World countries.63 Thus, any possible consensus was again reduced to
two quite different assessments of the Treaty system. Following the draft
resolution finally adopted by the First Committee by consensus, 6 4 the
General Assembly decided without a vote to include the "Question of
Antarctica" in the provisional agenda of the fortieth General Assembly of
1985.65
V. Concluding Remarks
Contrary to many high expectations, this year's U.N. debate on the
"Question of Antarctica" was not a major step forward toward a substantive
discussion of the problematic issues, e.g., the environmental questions, the
new mineral jurisdiction and the relevant legal and political implications.
Once again, the U.N. only provided the organizational framework for the
exchange of controversial viewpoints, rather than a forum for resolving the
political conflicts over Antarctica. This failure is, in the case of the "Ques-
tion of Antarctica," due to two principal reasons. First, the Parties view the
Treaty as a successful international arrangement. 66 They believe that it has
achieved its important political goals: continued denuclearization and de-
militarization of the continent, the guarantee of the free scientific research
and the use of Antarctica for exclusively peaceful purposes. These achieve-
ments, they feel, should be appreciated by the international community.
Many states, therefore, do not see a pressing political need for a new
international regime for Antarctica to replace the Treaty system.
62. The second informal draft resolution sponsored by Malaysia enumerated the issues a
future special Committee on Antarctica should cover. Malaysia abandoned that proposal at the
beginning of the debate in the first Committee; see statement of Rep. Zain (Malaysia), U.N.
Doc. A/39/C.1/PV 50, 11 (1984).
63. See Statement of Rep. Verna (India), U.N. Doc. A/39/C. 1/PV 53, 1 (1984); Statement of
Mr. Valle (Braz.), U.N. Doc. A/39/C.1/PV 50 (1984); see the harsh criticism of these two
statements by Ambassador Ghebo (Ghana), U.N. Doc. A/39/C.I/PV 53, 46 (1984).
64. G.A. Res. 39/152, Dec. 17, 1984 (based on Comm. res. at U.N. Doc. A/39/C.1/L. 83).
65. In the words of the Permanent Representative of Malaysia, "It is a draft with which none
of us is particularly happy, and perhaps in that very fact lies whatever merit it possesses ..
U.N. Doc. A/39/C.1/PV 55, 18 (1984).
66. Statement of Ambassador Sorzano (U.S.A.): "A look at the twenty-five years of the
Antarctic Treaty reveals its basic operational characteristic: It works." U.N. Doc. A/39/C. 1/PV
53, 61 (1984).
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In addition, the Malaysian initiative challenged the Antarctic Treaty too
generally. The initiative did not adequately distinguish the different areas of
application of the "common heritage principle, 67 to the Antarctic territory,
the marine life resources and the mineral resources of Antarctica. Only in
the latter case is the application of that principle legally arguable. Con-
fronted with the massive resistance of the Parties to the proposed Special
Committee on Antarctica, Malaysia and the other supporting states failed to
present compromising initiatives in order to intensify the discussion of the
"Question of Antarctica" at the United Nations.
67. See supra note 7; Zorn, supra note 12, at 11-17.
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